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Abstract  
Personal data that identifies individual persons is given some level of protection in many 
jurisdictions and for various reasons. In Europe, general privacy rights, mainly under the 1950 
Human Rights Convention has, for a long time, been the legal standard under which personal 
data was protected, at least partially. 
In the pursuit of helping create a single market and the role free movement of data has to that 
end, the 1995 Directive made an overhaul in both the legal and institutional infrastructure of 
data protection in Europe. At the center of the Directive rests clear stipulation of principles 
that data controllers should enforce and rights that individual data subjects enjoy. Thus, 
personal data can be validly processed if there is a legitimate basis for it. The Directive 
recognizes consent of data subjects as one of them. It further defines consent in such a way 
that it be ‘free’ ‘specific’ and ‘informed’, and the form of indication should be unambiguous 
or explicit, based on the type of data.  
Within the limits of conceptual difficulties in defining these traits in a meaningfully 
measurable way, they are meant to ensure that data subjects have a good deal of control over 
their data. More, technological advances and proliferation of internet based services 
unforeseen by the Directive, including social networks, are testing the efficacy of consent as a 
basis for processing and its appropriateness is seriously questioned. Such concerns are sound 
as the services are vast in reach and consent of their users has been the main refuge for their 
extensive data related operations. It is within this context that the paper attempts to review 
some salient features of Facebbook, a leading social network, and the degree of their 
compatibility with the consent requirements under the Directive.  
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1 Chapter One: An Introduction 
1.1 Background to the Study 
Unlike early privacy laws that mainly aimed at protecting individuals from intrusive 
government practices,1 the growing private actors with access to immense personal data 
means that the private sector is now the primary target of regulators.2 Among others, Social 
Networking Sites (SNSs) have been operating for some time now and are growing in use and 
influence. Facebook is an instance with over a billion active users. As a manifestation of the 
growing connectivity and changes in attitude, SNSs’ users tend and arguably are encouraged 
to disclose more data, and thus its misuse remains a source of worry.   
In Europe, as in many other regions, laws have been in place with a view to limiting these 
side effects. On top of some relevant human rights instruments, the European Data Protection 
Directive of 1995 (DPD) is currently the principal legal instrument in this regard. It provides 
some conditions and safeguards for a legitimate processing of personal data. These 
conditions, which are usually referred to as data protection (dp) principles, inter alia, 
guarantee a fair processing. Among the many ways that make operations on personal data of 
individuals3 fair and legitimate, securing the authorization or consent of the concerned 
individual is one. Consent stands out as a primary basis for a legitimate processing4 even if 
other legitimate ways of processing personal data that does not require consent of the data 
subject also exist.5 The centrality of consent is to be found in the fact that it “…legitimizes 
nearly any form of collection, use, or disclosure of personal data.”6 As a result, the Directive 
requires that the consent secured possesses some qualities, i.e. that it be informed, free, 
specific, unambiguous or explicit, as appropriate. As important as these qualities are, securing 
their compliance has been challenging to the extent that the appropriateness of ‘consent’ as a 
main factor in a data protection system is questioned. As such, one of the considerable 
                                                          
1
 Edwards (2009) p.447  
2
 The new revelations of extensive surveillance may, of course, trigger more laws on government powers once 
again.  
3
 The Directive calls them ‘data subjects’ (Art.2(a)) 
4
 Edwards (2013) p.23 
5
 For the private sector, the other important bases are contract and legitimate business interest that overrides the 
fundamental rights of the data subject (Borgesius (2013) p.12) 
6
 Solove (2013) p.1880, Custer and et al, (2013) p. 456 
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changes that the Proposed Regulation intends to make relates to consent. I, therefore, intend to 
inquire the appropriateness of consent as a justification for the processing of personal data; 
the place it is given under the existing relevant laws, mainly the Directive and the changes 
that the proposed data is introducing in this regard. The practical implementation of consent 
under the Directive will also be tested using Facebook as an instance.   
1.2  Research questions   
The thesis aspires to mainly inquire if the type of consent that Facebook users are giving to 
use the platform and in return for Facebook to make use of their data is compatible with the 
requirements of the European Data Protection Directive. It also intends to analyze the strength 
and weaknesses of using consent as a justification for the processing of personal data. With a 
view to answer these main questions, the qualities of ‘consent’ under the Directive and the 
application of the Directive on Facebook will be dealt with. The changes looming in the 
proposed regulation pertaining to the role of consent will also be dealt with in brief.  
1.3  Justifications for the study     
Data protection remains to be an important issue in public discourses with the increase in 
internet based services and the accumulation and monetization of mega data. In an attempt to 
limit the unnecessary pitfalls, laws have tried to limit the excess of data processing. In such a 
pursuit, the usual means has been to demand that the consent of data subjects is procured, as 
consent is the most used justification by those processing personal data. However, partly 
attributable to developments revolving around SNSs, the use of consent is undergoing some 
revision, at least in Europe. It, therefore, is worthwhile to inquire the existing scope and 
application of consent as a basis for a legitimate processing of personal data and the changes 
it is undergoing.  
As far as the selection is concerned, it suffices to state that Facebook is the leading social 
network site universally and in Europe. For instance, it is the single most popular SNSs in the 
great majority of European countries.7 Its widespread reach, therefore, makes it a sound 
choice of study. Of course, this assumes that the operations of Facebook fall under the ambit 
of the European dp laws, an issue to be investigated in the thesis as well.   
                                                          
7
 Edwards (2013) p. 2 
3 
 
1.4  Methodology 
Generally put, the theme of the thesis concerns itself with the regulation of online behavior 
through law. It inquires the role of consent, as a system of data processing, in the law; its 
appropriateness and challenges; and tests how its practical implementation is faring as applied 
on a selected Facebook operations and features.  
Among the possible appropriate laws at the European level, the Data Protection Directive will 
be at the heart of the analysis, even if other relevant laws are also consulted.  Accordingly, the 
conventional dogmatic interpretation of laws features out predominantly with a view to 
establishing the meaning and scope of the relevant provisions, which in turn, can be tested 
against its practical application on Facebook. To this end, interpretations rendered by relevant 
court cases, commentaries by scholars and opinions of relevant authorities, most importantly 
the Working Party 29 that is established under Art.29 of the Directive, will be reviewed, as its 
opinions have considerable persuasive authority, even if it is not authoritative.        
1.5 Structure of the Thesis 
The thesis comprises of three main parts. Following this introduction, an overview of data 
protection is provided. The chapter aims at introducing the central features of data protection; 
the values engaged; and the conditions in line with which processing of personal data is 
legitimate, i.e., data processing principles. Having discussed these themes and, thereby, 
introducing the tenets of data protection system, it proceeds to discuss the place that consent 
has been given under the Directive and its qualities/traits. The remaining part, then, goes to 
analyze the arguments for and against its centrality in dp laws. The discussion on the qualities 
of consent under the Directive will be used in the last chapter to assess Facebook’s operations 
in this regard.   
The third chapter takes on identifying the legal basis of data protection. I first discussed some 
relevant human rights instruments and how data protection, as a right, is treated in them. I 
tried to locate the role of consent under these instruments. The chapter, then, quickly moves to 
look at the Directive, as the main source of data protection. As such, the central elements of 
the Directive are discussed, particularly its scope of application. By so doing, I lay a 
foundation for the next chapter that establishes the Directive’s application on Facebook’s 
operations in Europe.  
4 
 
The last and main chapter briefly introduces how Facebook works and establishes the 
applicability of the Directive. It then moves to analyze some of its features that have been 
causes for privacy concern. As consent is the ultimate refuge for the processing users data by 
Facebook, and it is mainly regulated under Facebook’s ‘Statement of Rights and 
Responsibilities’ the salient points of the terms of use are analyzed. The chapter, then 
culminates with an assessment of the main elements of consent under the Directive against the 
practices of Facebook. Thus, whether the consent of users according to which data is being 
processed qualifies as informed, specific, free and unambiguous or explicit are tested.  
Lastly, the thesis sums up the major points of discussion and concludes with few foresight 
notes on the future of consent as a basis of data processing.   
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2 Chapter Two: Data Processing: An Overview  
2.1 Data Protection: Conceptual Framework   
Attempts that aim at limiting unwarranted access to and use of personal data has been in place 
for some time now, mainly through a set of rules known as data protection laws, at least in 
Europe.
8
 These set of rules are, nevertheless, fraught with controversies in both their relative 
normative values and ways of implementing them. As will be shown later, these difficulties 
principally emanate from the divergence in the understanding of what privacy is and its worth, 
as its protection usually entails restricting other important values. Thus, we ask: what is in the 
essence of data protection law?  
The following are some of the descriptions provided for the subject matter, data protection 
laws (dp laws in short). Lilian Edwards wrote that “data protection protects what is known 
very generally as informational privacy: loosely, the right to control what is known about 
you.”9 Similarly, Lee Beygrave understands it as a regime that attempts “…to secure the 
privacy, autonomy and integrity of individuals, and thereby a basis for democratic, pluralistic 
society in the face of massive growth in the amount of personal data gathered and shared by 
organizations.”10 In a similar tone, Professor Schwartz takes dp law to be a legal structure 
“that attempts to regulate knowledge and concealment of an individual's personal 
information.”11 With more emphasis on the law’s ‘controlling’ functions, it has also been 
described as a set of rules that “seek to block the flow of information.”12 Lastly, dp law is 
said to aim at protecting “…individual citizens against unjustified collection, storage, use 
and dissemination of their personal details,”13 a description seemingly closer to the way 
it is presented in actual dp laws, as we shall see.  
Many of the above descriptions being purposive in style, what stands out is the fact that dp 
laws in general aim at ensuring that individuals have a say on what is considered as their 
                                                          
8
 Bygrave, (2002) p.1 
9
 Edwards (2009) p.445 
10
 Bygrave (2002) p.8  
11
 Schwartz, 1995 p.1  
12
 Swire and Litan (1998) p.50  
13
 Hustinx (2005) p. 62 
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personal information or what is known about them. This, obviously, goes in line with 
one of the dominant components of ‘privacy’, a concept that finds itself at the center of 
dp discourses.  This being substantially in tune with the purposes of actual dp laws in 
general, the use of  terms such as ‘control’, ‘block’ or ‘concealment’ in the above 
descriptions, deserve some cautious look as their literal reading may give a wrong 
impression of what dp rules actually do. This is especially visible in relation to the use of 
SNSs. On this issue, professor Grimmelmann would argue that if attempt is made to 
control personal data (through dp laws) upon which the whole notion of networking 
depends and, thus “gets in the way of socializing, users disable and misuse them”.14 In 
other words, the purpose of dp rules is not to let individuals strictly control one’s 
personal data on SNSs per se as “redistribution of information is inevitable in a social 
network whose very purpose is to make information accessible to others.”15 It seems 
that such a critique is valuable in so far as it informs us not to take ‘controlling’ to mean 
the person being able to ‘own’ information about oneself and get some form of 
intellectual property protection, as this would be out of touch with reality, especially in 
the age of online socializing. As Bygrave has aptly asserted “… it is important to note that 
data protection laws rarely give persons an absolute right to dispense with data about 
themselves as they see fit.”16 In short, dp laws help individuals not in controlling their 
personal information as such, but in influencing the terms under which they can be used. 
Thus, Culnan’s description of dp regimes as dealing with “the ability of an individual to 
control the terms under which their personal information is acquired and used”17 can be 
taken as a better expression.  
A glance at dp laws, say the European Data Protection Directive of 1995, also reveals 
that they are more on safeguarding against unnecessary and excessive intrusions on 
individuals’ personal information. The Directive, for instance, attempts to ensure, among 
others, that data is fairly collected; is used for the ends it was collected/meant for; and 
that its integrity is kept intact.   
Having said this, it is imperative to note that some alternative expressions are used in laws 
and literature alike to describe the area of law under discussion. Bygrave identifies data 
                                                          
14
 Grimmelman, (2008) p.1140 
15
 Rubinstein and Good (2013)  p.1348 
16
 Bygrave (2001) paragraph  8 
17
 Culnan (2000) p.1  
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protection, privacy law, and data privacy as the most common ones.
18
 As to their relative 
strength and weaknesses in depicting the subject matter, Bygrave offers us the following 
analysis. The expression ‘data protection’, being popular in Europe, “fails to indicate 
expressly the central interests served by the norms to which it is meant to apply.”19 In other 
words, the idiom gives a wrong impression that what is being protected is a data, whereas it is 
actually individual persons that such laws try to protect. On the other hand, it has an 
advantage over the use of ‘privacy law’ as it delineates its confines to data/information, thus 
excluding the wide range of areas privacy traditionally encompasses. Using the term ‘privacy’ 
in the expression, he argues, risks both under and over-inclusion.
20
 Under-inclusion in that dp 
laws include notions that are not typically dealt within privacy discourses like the integrity of 
a data.
21
 For instance, Norway’s principal dp legislation has “adequate quality of personal 
information” as one of its objectives.22 Over-inclusion is also the case as privacy goes well 
beyond the normal stretches of the dp regime.
23
 Instances include privacy safeguards against 
unlawful raids of one’s house on which dp laws are barely relevant.24  
Apart from their scope, there are also some important differences. It suffices here to mention 
the fact that in privacy proper, the focus of protection is principally what is understood as 
‘private sphere’. Whereas in dp what is protected is personal data, i.e., ‘any information 
relating to an identified or identifiable natural person’ (DPD, Art.2(a)), which at times may 
include publicly known information as it does not have to be private or intimate information.
25
 
On the other hand, ‘data privacy’, an expression Bygrave prefers to use, mitigates at least the 
over-inclusion mentioned above by focusing on ‘data’, and at the same time indicating the 
substantial similarities with privacy proper.
26
 However, it seems that the phrase still suffers 
from the very same shortcomings of the expression ‘data protection’ as it does not really tell 
who the beneficiary is. Besides, as the same writer has in his previous work argued, the use of 
the term ‘privacy’ may also have some other unintended effect. This is so because as privacy 
has been usually portrayed as benefiting individuals and thus “...essentially in conflict with 
                                                          
18
 Bygrave (2014) pp.26-29 
19
 Ibid, p.28 
20
 Ibid, p.29 
21
 Ibid 
22
 Bygrave (2010) p. 173 
23
 Bygrave (2014) p-29 
24
 For instance, the wide scope of the term is expressed as follows. “Currently, privacy is a sweeping concept, 
encompassing (among other things) freedom of thought, control over one’s body, solitude in one’s home, control 
over personal information, freedom from surveillance, protection of one’s reputation, and protection from 
searches and interrogations.”, Solove, (2008) p.1 
25
 Bygrave (2014) p. 129  
26
 Ibid, p.29 
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the needs of society”, associating data protection with privacy (here through the use of 
‘privacy’ in the terminology) “…runs the risk of obscuring the fact that data protection laws 
benefit not only individuals qua individuals but society as a whole.”27  
Hence, it is clear that there are difficulties of nomenclature in all the popular expressions just 
discussed. Thus, we will stick to using ‘data protection’ as the main focus of this paper is the 
European regime, where the expression is rather the standard. After all, our discussion will 
mainly revolve around the Data Protection Directive! 
As to the development of the dp regime, even if many factors are mentioned, advance in 
information technology, computers and now the internet at the center, is agreed to be the 
single most important reason that necessitated the emergence and growth of dp regimes.
28
 The 
threatening aspect was the automated processing of information on individuals that computers 
were capable of sustaining and trivializing.
29
  
At last, some common features that run across many dp laws deserve some consideration. 
Bygrave, in his recent work, has identified three of them. Accordingly, dp laws are said to be 
principally statutory, where the core rules are to be found in a designated legislation as is 
typical in Europe.
30
 Secondly, dp laws usually establish an independent body that oversees 
their implementation, like that of the National Data Protection Authorities (DPAs) in many 
European countries.
31
 Lastly, he correctly observed that many dp statutes take a form of 
‘framework laws.’32 By this he meant that what we usually find in dp laws are principles that 
need to be observed in processing personal data instead of detailed rules of dos and don’ts, 
hence a usual reference to ‘dp principles’.    
 
2.2. Data Protection and the Interests/Values to Balance    
As we have briefly discussed, the notion of data protection is greatly interlinked with and 
usually discussed in relation to privacy. It happens that dp, in the same way as privacy, often 
competes with other equally important values. In other words, when we try to implement dp 
principles and thereby ensure that the processing of personal information is allowed only 
                                                          
27
 Bygrave (2001) paragraph $ 20  
28
 Fuster (2014) pp. 29-33, Purtova (2011) p.41, Bygrave (2014) p.9, Swire and Litan (1998) p.2 
29
 Fuster p. 29. Also, the fact that the DPD’s main focus is on processing by automatic means resonates with this.   
30
 Bygrave (2014) p.3  
31
 ibd 
32
 Ibid 
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under certain conditions, we usually stand at the crossroads against other important values. In 
the words of a writer named Rath Gavison, “when  we  study  the  cases  in  which  the law 
suggests  that a  "right to  privacy"  has been violated,  we  always  find  that  some  other  
interest  has  been  involved.”33 This, of course, is common in many rights. 
The significance and worth of dp laws has been expressed in various forms. Often, the 
protection of one’s privacy is presented as its core justification. Nevertheless, this only tells us 
little as the idea and values of privacy itself is ‘in disarray’, as Solove would put it.34 The 
other way of justifying the importance of having dp laws is to regard data protection as a 
fundamental interest to be protected in its own right.
35
 Still, some specific purposes that dp 
laws serve are also provided. Personal autonomy, integrity and dignity of individuals are 
among the specific interests dp laws help protect, which together try to achieve ‘individual 
goals of self realization.’36 By this it means that by providing protections against excessive 
monitoring and surveillance through the collection and analysis of personal data, dp laws help 
individuals act autonomously and without being ‘seen’ when they don’t want to.  Ultimately, 
helping develop ‘capacity to resist social pressures to conform with dominant views’37 is one 
of the important values that data protection inculcates on its beneficiaries.  
Let us now briefly consider some of the values and interests that often conflict with privacy 
and data protection values. As a general opposition, dp is said to be “detrimental to societal 
needs.”38 The needs that allegedly should triumph over dp and its values are usually of 
societal or economic nature. To mention some, free access to information and its importance 
for an effective social welfare system is mentioned as an interest against which dp laws stand. 
This was, for instance, one of the major considerations during the debates that led to the 
adoption of Swedish dp law in the early 1970’s.39 dp regimes are also attacked as standing in 
the way of medical researches and thereby contributing ‘for patients to die,40 pointing to the 
fact that dp laws may put limitations on the accessibility of patients’ data that might be used 
for important medical research. On the same token, storage and accessibility of previous 
convictions is mentioned yet as another societal need against which dp laws stand. Framing 
                                                          
33
 Gavison (1980), p.422 
34
 Solove (2008) The first chapter of the book is aptly titled: ‘Privacy: A Concept in Disarray’ 
35
 Bygraves (2014) p.118 
36
 Westin (1967) in Bygrave Ibid 
37
 Rouvroy and Poullet (2009) p.46 
38
 Bygrave (2010) p.171  
39
 Backman (2011)  p.115  
40
 Brownsword (2009) p. 84 
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the above arguments along the rights discourse, ‘access/right to information’ versus dp rights 
might be a possible description.  
Related to this, another societal value, which usually is discussed alongside with dp is 
freedom of expression. These values may at times supplement one another and at other times 
stand against each other. For instance, dp laws help freedom of expression by barring IT 
companies from disclosing the identity of dissenters to oppressive governments.
41
 On the 
other hand, as the Linqvist case before the ECJ demonstrated, extended application of dp laws 
means that even mentioning relationships on the net maybe found to be faulty on account of 
dp laws.
42
  Still on societal needs against dp, it is claimed that these laws “increase the risk 
that people misrepresent themselves and defraud others.”43 As to the economic arguments 
against dp laws, the common trend is to emphasize on the importance of information in the 
market-based economy and thereby show the need and economic benefits of free information 
accessibility for the economy and consumers involved.
44
  
Many of these arguments seem to overlook the fact that dp laws mainly empower and not 
dictate the individual beneficiary, as we shall see. Moreover, they overlook the balancing 
attempts that dp laws between the values of protecting personal data and other legitimate 
interests.  
 
2.3. Data Protection Principles  
 
As mentioned above, dp laws usually take the form of principles. Such a formulation is 
advantageous as it provides an opportunity for subsequent development of the laws as needs 
arise, mainly in keeping with advances in technology.
45
 In what follows, the core principles 
that the principal EU data protection instrument, the Data Protection Directive (DPD), 
contains will be introduced. It is understood that the Directive is the most visible among 
similar instruments and has directly influenced national dp legislations in Europe,
46
 and, thus, 
it is our focus of study.  
                                                          
41
 Leenes and Oomen (2009) p.154. The case of Yahoo! aiding the Chinese government is relevant here.  
42
 Poullet (2006) p.224 
43
 Bergkamp et al (2002) p.35 
44
 Ibid, p.32 
45
 Bygrave (2014) p.3 
46
 Nouwt (2009) p 288 
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Among the important dp principles, which are mainly to be found under Art.6 of the 
Directive, is the principle of fair and lawful processing.
47
 The essence is that personal data 
shall be processed fairly and lawfully. The application of the principle extends right from the 
collection of personal data to any form of processing and is arguably the broadest in scope. It 
also overlaps with many of the other principles. While the requirement of ‘lawfulness’ in the 
principle is more or less self-explanatory, ‘fairness’ is rather ambiguous. Recital 28 of the 
DPD talks about being fair to the individual concerned. It is argued that fairness, among 
others, implies that any data controller
48
 should take into account the interests and reasonable 
expectations of the data subjects when processing.
49
 Fairness also dictates that regard should 
be had on the methods of obtaining consent.
50
 Further, the requirement implicates balancing 
and proportionality between dp and other values.
51
 Consent, for instance, is one requirement 
that makes the processing of personal data lawful and legitimate, even if the fairness principle 
may require more.  
Another principle enshrined under the DPD is the principle of minimality. Mainly targeted at 
the stage of collection, the principle demands that data is relevant and non-excessive in 
relation to the purpose for which it was collected,
52
 and stands against data collection if a 
specific purpose can be achieved without the processing of personal data.
53
 Accordingly, the 
principle tries to ensure that even if a legitimate ground for processing of personal data exists, 
it does not mean that the controller has a free ride on that data. Instead, the collection should 
be limited to data that is necessary for the purpose allowed and its storage and use is also 
limited in time. Echoing the temporal limitation, Art.6 (1(e)) requires that personal data is 
erased once it serves the purpose for which it was collected. The possibility of erasing 
irrelevant data under Art.12(b) of the DPD can also be considered as an additional expression 
of the principle.  
Related to the principle of minimality is what is usually termed as the principle of purpose 
specification or the ‘finality principle’. At the crux of the principle is the requirement that 
                                                          
47
 DPD, Art.6(1(a)) 
48Data controller is defined as a person who “…determines the purposes and means of processing of personal 
data, DPD, Art.2(d) 
49
 Bygrave (2014) p.146. Processing under the DPD (Art.2(b)) is understood broadly and includes  collection, 
recording, organization, storage , adaptation or alteration, retrieval , consultation, use, disclosure by 
transmission, dissemination or otherwise making available, alignment or combination, blocking, erasure or 
destruction. 
50
 Edwards(2009) p. 464 
51
 Bygrave (2014) pp.146-147 
52
 Art.6 (1)c)) of the DPD mainly stipulates this principle. 
53
 Rodot`a (2009) p.81  
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from the outset
54
, personal data needs to be collected for a specified purpose. Besides, the data 
so collected should not be used or reused in a way incompatible with that purpose.
55
 Bygrave 
relates the rationale behind the principle to respecting the reasonable expectation of the data 
subject.
56
 In other words, when a person consents to the collection of certain personal data, 
she would reasonably expect that the data is solely used for the purpose for which the consent 
was given. The breach of such a legitimate expectation ends up in over disclosure of personal 
data, meaning “… more uses of information than a customer has agreed.” 57 
 The principle, therefore, tries to alleviate some problems like that of unintended use of data, 
as is also called as ‘scope creep’ and that of collecting data for no particular reason or 
otherwise known as ‘fishing.’58 However, as thoughtful as the principle is, it is hard, or to 
some, almost impossible to enforce
59
 mainly because assessing the compatibility or otherwise 
of a purpose for which data was legitimately collected with that of a further purpose for which 
the same data might be needed is usually extremely difficult.
60
 The advance in the storage 
capacity of computers and database technology is yet another source of difficulty, as 
“increasingly refined methods of data analytics is improving the ability to draw meaningful 
correlations between ever larger data sets.”61 
The principle of proportionality is yet another dp principle that lurks in some principles like 
that of ‘fair and lawful’ or ‘purpose limitation’. In relation to fairness, for instance, 
proportionality is manifested “in the balancing of the respective interests of data subjects and 
controllers”62 and, therefore, is applicable even if processing is based on consent of a data 
subject.
63
 As an element of the ‘purpose limitation’ principle, proportionality figures in the 
identification of the very purpose for a certain processing.
64
 Incidentally, the fact that the 
principle has not been clearly provided under the DPD is considered, by some, as providing 
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the judiciary with an additional leverage to impose limitations on data processing 
operations.
65
  
On top of the above principles, which come in the form of imposing obligations mainly on the 
data processors, the DPD also enshrines principles that directly empower data subjects.
66
 The 
principal part of them are what Bygrave, fittingly, termed them as ‘principle of data subject 
influence’.67 These are various rules that aim at informing data subjects about data processing 
and granting them access to their personal data and possibility of erasure. Instances include 
the important pieces of information that data subjects need to get from data controllers as 
provided under Articles 10 and 11 of the DPD. Besides, the access rights recognized under 
Art.12(a) of DPD that enable data subjects to inquire and get a confirmation as to whether 
their personal data is being processed and if so its details makes part of the principle. 
Furthermore, data subjects have a right to get rectification, erasure or blockage of further use 
if the data is collected or held illegally or is irrelevant or incomplete or inaccurate.
68
 The right 
to object processing under Art.14 and the prohibition against the making of decisions that 
affect persons’ interests based on fully automated assessment of one’s character, as enshrined 
under Art.15, also provide data subjects with more influence.   
Lastly, principles of data quality (integrity) that focuses on the need to keep personal data 
‘accurate and up to date’69 and data security, which tries to guard personal data against 
unauthorized access or alteration are also recognized under the DPD.
70
  
2.4. Justifications and limitations of consent as a basis for the 
processing of Personal Data  
2.4.1. Consent under the DPD  
As briefly highlighted above, consent of data subjects is one of the grounds that render the 
processing of personal data prima facie legitimate, as the title of Art.7 of the DPD reveals. To 
begin with, consent is defined as “…any freely given specific and informed indication of his 
                                                          
65
 bid p.149 
66
 DPD Recital 25 talks about the dual way of protection.  
67
 Ibid pp.158ff 
68
 DPD, Art.12 (b and c) 
69
 DPD, Art.6(1(d)). Incidentally, the title ‘principles of data quality’ preceding Art.6 of the DPD seems rather 
confusing. 
70
 Art.17 of DPD. A processor according to the same instrument being the person “…which processes personal 
data on behalf of the controller.” DPD, Art.2(e) 
14 
 
wishes by which the data subject signifies his agreement to personal data relating to him being 
processed.”71 The qualities that the indication of data subject’s agreement be ‘freely given’, 
‘specific’ and ‘informed’ are of great importance in the definition. Specifically, it should be 
borne in mind that these are ingredient elements of the very term ‘consent’ on top of whatever 
further quality is attached as a requirement for processing.
72
 The Working Party has furnished 
us with a good deal of guidelines as to the possible meaning of these elements, as discussed 
below. 
Accordingly, for a consent to be considered as ‘freely given’ the data subject should be 
“…able to exercise a real choice and there is no risk of deception, intimidation, coercion or 
significant negative consequences if he/she does not consent.”73 This is quite high threshold. 
In particular, the notion of significant negative consequence for not consenting seems to 
resonate to the realities of SNSs, where the decline to give consent has the result of denying 
access. Even if, as the Working Party explained, the application of ‘free consent’ is clearly 
problematic in a situation where the data subject would not have a real choice due to 
subordination as in an employment relationship, ‘financial’ or ‘emotional’ dimension of the 
consequence are also relevant.
74
 It should also be noted that free consent also implies that 
consent can be withdrawn, arguably without ‘significant negative consequence,’ as an implicit 
requirement under the Directive.
75
 
Concerning ‘specific’ consent, at the core of the requirement is that the consent should relate 
to a named and clearly identified aspect of processing. One way of defining it is to say that it 
‘cannot apply to an open-ended set of processing activities.’76 This would mean that specific 
consent should be acquired for possibly different purposes for which the data can be 
employed, be it promotion, studying customer preferences or transferring of data to a third 
party. In this regard however, the Working Party has pointed out that a separate consent might 
not be needed if operations are related and thus falls within data subjects’ reasonable 
expectation.
77
 It seems that a narrower interpretation is called for not to defeat the very 
purpose of the requirement. Besides, specificity of consent means that the data subject knows 
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“which data are processed and for which purposes.”78 From the forgoing discussion, we can 
notice how specific consent greatly depends on the data subject being informed, which is 
incorporated in the very definition of consent under Art.2(h).   
An informed consent is given when it is “based upon an appreciation and understanding of the 
facts and implications of an action.”79 This requirement is helped by the obligations that the 
DPD imposes on controllers as envisaged under Articles 10 and 11. Both the content and the 
presentation of the information given are crucial here. Thus, enough information as to what 
happens with the data need to be given. The presentation also needs to be simple and 
understandable, for instance, using plain text, avoiding jargons, and visible in terms of 
location, size and font choices.
80
  An important yardstick of a ‘regular/average user’ is used to 
decide if the information provided is understandable, and thus consent given to it is 
‘informed.81 Relevant to SNSs, it is suggested that dialogue boxes are among the appropriate 
tools. 
In addition to these intrinsic traits of consent, data processing is legitimate if, among others, 
the data subject “… has unambiguously given his consent” as per Art.7(a) of DPD.82 Further, 
the processing of ‘special categories of data’, also called ‘sensitive data’ such as racial or 
ethnic origin, political opinions, religious or philosophical beliefs, trade-union membership, 
and concerning health or sex life require an explicit consent.
83
         
According to WP29, the ‘unambiguous’ requirement implies that no doubt exists that the data 
subject has given consent.
84
 The need for an action from the side of the data subject can also 
be read from the words ‘indications’ and ‘signifying’ in the definitional provision of Art.2(h). 
As a result, a positive action from the data subject is needed and “a mere inaction will not be 
enough”85 In addition, consent has to be given before the processing starts.86   
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As to sensitive personal data, the fact that they are considered intensively personal seems to 
be clear from the way the Directive treats them, and thus stringent requirements for their 
processing. Hence, the ‘explicit consent’ under Art.8 is understood to demand more than what 
unambiguous consent under Art.7 requires. For instance, ‘explicit consent’ would mean that 
there needs to be a clear and separate request for the processing of such data from the side of 
the controller that needs to be clearly and affirmatively replied to by the concerned data 
subject, even if it does not have to be in a written form.
87
 Of course, the latter conclusion is 
clear from the fact that a ‘written’ qualification of explicit consent is now deleted from a 
similar provision in the earlier draft of the DPD.
88
 Opt-out solutions are also, obviously, 
excluded.
89
 Incidentally, it is to be noted that the selection of the so called ‘sensitive’ data 
under the Directive is criticized as outdated, not fitting the prevailing worries of the 21 
century.
90
      
Under the DPD, consent is only one of the grounds that make the processing of personal data 
fair and lawful. The other grounds are: when processing is necessary (1) for the performance 
of a contract to which the data subject is party; (2) for compliance with a legal obligation to 
which the controller is subject; (3) to protect the vital interests of the data subject; (4) or for 
the purposes of the legitimate interests pursued by the controller that override data protection 
interests of data subjects.
91
 In relation to the last ground, the justification only lasts until data 
subjects object the processing under Art.14 of the DPD.    
This said, among the valid grounds for personal data processing, consent stands out in its 
popularity in use
92
 and its scope. Consent has a wider application in that it “legitimizes nearly 
any form of collection, use, or disclosure of personal data.”93 The other grounds, on the other 
hand, should go through, mainly, the test of necessity and can only be used in relation to the 
designated purpose. On this, the Working Party concedes that the other grounds “… require a 
“necessity” test, which strictly limits the context in which they can apply.”94 Of course, it 
should be noted that consent does not give a free ride to controllers as basic duties that the 
DPD imposes on them still remains intact and data subjects cannot contract out all of the 
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protections guaranteed such as access rights.
95
 Besides, there seems to be a consensus that 
consent, however frequently in use, is not given precedence in normative weight under the 
DPD, even if it is not disallowed.
96
 Meaning, the other grounds justify processing of personal 
data as much as consent does.   
Yet, consent is wide in scope and, thus, frequently used as a ground for the processing of 
personal data. This is particularly common in SNSs. Hence, the strengths and weaknesses of 
this consent-based processing system deserve a scrutiny. Following are some of the major 
arguments from both sides.   
2.4.2. Justifying Consent as a Basis for the Processing of Personal Data 
One way of justifying as to why consent should remain as a ground for processing of personal 
data is linked to the very conception of the dp regime as an enabling system for individuals to 
decide on the dissemination of data identifying them. With this comes an argument that “as 
nobody is better placed to judge if he or she wants to disseminate data about his or her self, 
individual consent is necessarily a legitimate ground for the processing of personal data.
97
 The 
fact that the argument rests on the ideal of individual autonomy, I think, makes is appealing.  
Besides, Brownsword convincingly provides some more specific advantages of using consent 
as a justifying reason for the processing of personal data. The first is that consent makes 
specific, ‘in personam’ response possible.98 This means, “consent does not comprehensively 
justify the action as such”; rather, it only prevents the consenting person from claiming as 
wronged.
99
 Accordingly, other persons in similar situations can refuse processing. This aspect 
of consent has a particular relevance where data from many data subjects is necessary to make 
a processing meaningful. The other advantage of consent that Brownsword identified is that 
consent justifies an action by ‘negating a wrong rather than by way of overriding a right.’100 
By this, the writer refers to the advantages of consent in sparing us from comparing and 
choosing between values. By consenting to a processing, individuals are not valuing their 
personal data any less compared to any other value that the consent might bring them. Indeed, 
as the main right holders and beneficiaries of the dp system, it is only logical to let individuals 
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decide for themselves the extent and time of disclosure of personal data in order to get what 
they deem important at a certain time. 
2.4.3. Limitation of Consent as a Basis for the Processing of Personal Data  
Against the above and related justifications of consent as a legitimatizing tool for personal 
data processing, three strands of critique can be observed, namely those that consider consent 
as being too difficult/costly to meet; those that consider consent as being too easy to acquire 
and/or evade; and those who neutrally challenge its appropriateness as a norm. To begin with 
the last, it is held that permitting processing of personal data based on consent tantamount to 
making personal data appear like alienable commodity and thus borders to denying the moral 
status of privacy as if it is only protected at the discretion of individuals.
101
 In response to this, 
I would adhere to Brownsword’s assertion that in a right-based dp system, which the DPD is, 
choice or “consent functions as a dynamic between agents”102 meaning that consent is an 
indispensable tool that enables individuals to show preferences of values at a certain moment 
and based on their circumstances.  
Proceeding to the first set of arguments, we find various utilitarian viewpoints that run on the 
assumption that the requirement of consent stands in the way of other important societal 
gains. They would, accordingly, treat the requirement of consent as a ‘tax on transaction’103 
and thus, uneconomical or claim that consent and its qualities (such as it being specific, 
informed, unambiguous or explicit) are obstacles to achieve societal benefits, be it in the form 
of security, administration, or medical research or international trade. The most important 
flaw of such arguments, at least from the perspective of the DPD, is what Brownsword would 
label as ‘the fallacy of necessity’.104 Accordingly, these arguments wrongly assume as if 
consent is always necessary for personal data processing to ever happen. This simply ignores 
the considerable number of grounds that equally justify the processing of personal data 
without data subjects’ consent, as discussed above.105    
The last and more challenging string of arguments against consent comes from those who 
underscore the easiness of acquiring consent or inefficiency of the consent-based system in 
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protecting personal data. Even if the arguments may take different forms, a concern that 
individuals are, to a large degree, not in a position to give the kind of consent required by the 
laws in the age of information technology services is the central point. Besides, even if they 
can, there is little, if any, way of ensuring that the data acquired according to their consent is 
only used for the purpose for which it was given.  
In support of this, there are plenty of studies, which reveal that Internet, and mainly SNSs, 
users do not either read or understand the terms of use that include issues on personal data 
processing.
106
 This might relate to the use of difficult jargons, lengthy policies, difficult 
layout, exhaustion to frequently and carefully think through privacy issue,
107
 or even thinking 
that there is no advantage of so doing, anyways.
108
 For instance, a recent study concluded that 
“it would take 76 work days to read the privacy policies that a normal person encounters in a 
year!”109 Facebook’s privacy policy in 2010, for instance, was ca 6000 words in length, 
‘longer than the US Constitution.’110 Besides, data controllers might not sufficiently inform 
the data subject on the purpose and manner of processing because of trade secrecy.
111
 Under 
these conditions, it is questionable is the consent ‘given’ qualifies as informed. Besides, a 
difficulty remains as to the actual quantum or degree of information that a person needs to 
have to make an informed decision, including consenting.  
In addition, even if there was a chance that users read and understand the terms,
112
 the kind of 
consent they give is not free as they “cannot choose to refuse certain conditions.”113 As noted 
above, for a consent to be considered as freely given, data subjects need to have a real choice.  
In the vast majority of internet services, there is a binary choice “between a full registration 
and abandoning the service.”114 Cognizant of this specifically in social networks, the WP29 
stressed that they need to provide potential users with an option, where consent for processing 
of personal data can be freely given independently of users ‘ability to access the service.115 
This, however, is not what is happening in practice, as we shall see. Similarly, it is also 
forcefully argued that in the context of workplace, the consent that employees provide for the 
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processing of their personal data hardly qualifies as freely given.
116
 The same goes to consent 
given to data controllers in monopoly position.
117
 It is, therefore, not hard to argue that a 
consent given under a situation where the alternative is a putative denial of service is hardly 
free. Besides, as consent, for example, in many SNSs is secured by ticking privacy policy 
boxes as part of registration, the requirement of ‘specific’ consent becomes rather an 
illusion.
118
 Cognizant of this problem, the WP29 has indicated that users need to be provided 
with the possibility of selecting among the uses of their data by SNSs,
119
 which is not being 
followed, as we shall see.    
It appears that the tangible problems of using consent as a justification for the processing of 
personal data are primarily practical and specifically that of enforcement. Among others, there 
are difficulties in defining the notion of informed consent in such a way that it extracts a 
needed level of compliance. Besides, a clear divergence between the legal requirements of 
‘free’ and ‘specific’ consent and the practice is noted. Some of these limitations seem to be 
attributable to the difficulty of succinctly defining these terms. In general, as Bygrave and 
Schartum would put it, “there are legal difficulties with properly interpreting consent 
requirements.”120 In addition, we have seen that in few areas, consent does not seem to be the 
appropriate tool to ensure personal data is protected.  
In summation, I would concede that the legitimacy of consent-based dp system is open to 
question as can be seen from the visible definitional and practical flaws it is fraught with. Yet, 
given its advantage of relying on personal autonomy and hoping on the potential gains and 
indeed possibilities of improved application of consent requirements still gives consent-based 
dp system a strong bent. Moreover, the absence of a better alternative in place gives it a 
relative advantage. For instance, reverting to the paternalistic comprehensive licensing 
scheme, where processing is much conditional upon DPAs’ approval instead of data subjects’ 
permission, is ruled out as unrealistic.
121
 Similarly, a suggestion of data protection system 
based on informational obligations of confidentiality instead of data subjects’ rights is well 
refuted by Brownsword as inefficient and for being limited in scope.
122
 Hence, it seems that 
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improving the enforcement of consent requirements, including through awareness creation of 
data subjects would be the way forward.  
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3 Chapter Three: Legal Standards for Data Protection in Europe: Focus on 
Consent as a Basis of Personal Data Processing  
In this chapter, I will briefly discuss relevant legal instruments that lay the legal basis for the 
protection of personal data. Understandably, the discussion is mainly based on European laws 
and consent of data subjects as a basis for the processing of personal data will be the central 
theme. Among the laws, the Directive is given a relatively lengthy coverage as it is the major 
instrument and its analysis is aimed at establishing its application on Facebook, which is to be 
taken up in the subsequent chapters.  
3.1. Human Rights as a Basis for Data Protection 
3.1.1. Un Human Rights Instruments   
As noted above, right to data protection is interlinked with privacy and dp laws usually 
present right to privacy of individuals as one of their rationales. It is within this context that, 
for instance, the UDHR’s recognition of right to privacy under Art.12 is understood as 
including data protection, as well.
123
 Besides, Art.17 of the ICCPR that recognizes a right 
against the interference of one’s privacy is authoritatively interpreted by the Human Rights 
Committee so as to include the protection of personal data. Accordingly, “individuals should 
have the right to ascertain…whether, and if so, what personal data is stored in automatic data 
files, and for what purpose.”124 Rights of rectifying incorrect personal data is also recognized 
in the interpretation.
125
 It is also imperative to note that the right is understood to be equally 
applicable on both governments and private actors alike under the Convention.
126
  Hence, it 
can be argued that the human rights basis of data protection, albeit indirectly, can be traced 
back to the early codification of the modern human rights system.  
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3.1.2. The European Human Rights Convention and Convention 108    
The 1950 European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental 
Freedoms (ECHR) has been the major legal standard for the right to privacy, and by 
extension, right to data protection for a long time. Article 8 of the Convention declares that 
“everyone has the right to respect for his private and family life …” With time, this right of 
respect for ‘private life’ has been widely interpreted in the rich jurisprudence of the European 
Court of Human Rights (ECtHR), as including personal data. This is in line with the Court’s 
general approach of “regarding the ECHR as a living instrument to be interpreted each time in 
light of ‘present-day conditions.’”127 Some case decisions such as Amann v Switzerland,128 
and Rotaru v Romania
129
 attest to this. However, it is argued that the way the court has 
interpreted Art.8 as including personal data is not purely based on the ECHR, but rather in 
conjunction with an important instrument, the Council of Europe Data Protection Convention 
(Convention 108) of 1981.
130
  
The observation is sound as this latter Convention, after all, was resulted from the doubts that 
the Council of Europe felt with the emergence of modern technologies in the 1960s and their 
implications on the protection of ‘private life’. Specifically, it felt “doubtful whether Article 8 
of the ECHR offered any satisfactory safeguards in this area, particularly because …[it] was 
only applicable to interferences by public authorities, and not by private parties.”131 In 
response to the personal scope issue, Article 3(1) of Convention 108 made it clear that it 
applies on both public and private sectors. Concerning its relation to the fundamental right of 
privacy under Art.8 of the ECHR, two related observations are in order.  
The first is that despite its human rights foundations, the instrument also provides the 
achievement of greater unity in Europe through free flow of information as its objective, as 
the first preamble reveals. This objective is, actually, said to have persisted ever since its 
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inception, for the consensus was for it “… to refrain from laying obstacles in the way of 
international trade and commerce.”132  
The second observation, flowing from the first, relates to the fact that even if Convention 108 
was meant to further the application of Art.8, the jurisdiction of the ECtHR over it is 
contested.
133
 Of course, the Court has used Convention 108 in cases dealing with Art.8 and 
indeed, Convention 108, more or less, replicates the permitted interferences on Art.8 based on 
‘law, legitimate purpose, and necessity in a democratic society’.134 Yet, the differences persist 
and personal data is only partly protected. For instance, in both Amann v Switzerland, and 
Rotaru v Romania, the ECtHR considered the respective data as part of ‘private life’ under 
Art.8, not simply because it ‘relates to an identified or identifiable individual’ as Convention 
108 requires (Art.2(a)), but because ‘the event recedes into the past’ (it has been there for a 
long time) and information was stored systematically. Similarly in Gaskin v. United 
Kingdom,
135
 while the court recognizes access rights of personal data based on Art.8, it, 
nonetheless, insisted that Art.8 does not give a general right to access personal data. Besides, 
in Gaskin, the focus was not on the information being related to the applicant as an identified 
individual, but on the impact of not being able to access it.
136
 In a way, to the Court “there is 
processing of personal data that affects private life and processing of personal data that does 
not affect the private life of individuals.”137 What is more, the Court uses difficult-to-grasp 
criteria in making the choice. Recently, the Court has indicated that it considers among others, 
“…the context in which the data had been collected and stored, their nature, the way they 
were used and treated and the results obtainable from the processing,”138 which does not 
really provide a meaningful guide.   
What we observe from the discussion above is that reading data protection from Art.8 of the 
ECHR is rather immersed with caveats which limits its protection. Yet, the inclusion of 
Convention 108 within its remits means that the Court “… has put some additional 
constitutional pressure on [its] implementation.”139 Indeed, as a pioneer in providing many of 
the dp principles in Europe and its potentially wide territorial scope (Art.23), Convention 108 
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has served as basis for ‘all subsequent European legislation,’140 and thus its importance cannot 
be undermined. 
Setting aside the difficulty of finding the conditions under which personal data can be 
protected under Art.8 of the ECHR, where does consent figure out as a justifying ground for 
personal data processing? To begin with, as in many human rights instruments, the ECHR 
provides admissible interferences against the right to privacy, and by extension right to data 
protection. Accordingly, it is not an interference if privacy right is limited based on a law and 
the limitation is necessary in a democratic society (Art.8(2)). In addition, the limitation should 
be to pursue a legitimate aim or interest that the Convention exhaustively lists, including 
national security, public safety and rights and freedoms of others. Convention 108 also 
provides similar conditions, but with few changes in the list of interests that privacy may give 
way to under the conditions of lawfulness and necessity.  
From the preceding discussion, we can notice that ‘consent’ is not specifically provided for as 
a legitimate ground for the limitation of data protection right under both the ECHR and 
Convention 108 unlike, say, the DPD. However, it can be argued that with a different 
formulation and perhaps stringent requirements, consent is indirectly recognized. This is 
because ‘consent’ provides a justification for the processing of personal data under the DPD. 
The DPD, in turn, is an EU law according to which Member States have adopted laws to give 
effect to its provisions.
141
 Thus, the legality requirement under Art.8(2) of the ECHR is duly 
satisfied. However, as the Court has hitherto been engaging cases of non-consensual data 
processing, it is yet to be seen how it will weigh consent-based processing with the ‘necessary 
in a democratic society’ requirements.142  
3.1.3. The European Human Rights Charter     
Since its adoption in 2000, the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union has 
elevated the human rights status of data protection to a new high. Unlike the 1950 ECHR, 
where data protection is considered as a facet of the right to privacy, the charter treats data 
protection as an autonomous right of its own.  
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Apart from providing right to privacy under Art.7, the Charter states that “[E]veryone has the 
right to the protection of personal data concerning him or her.”143 This being the first of its 
kind in providing a separate fundamental right to data protection, it also includes many of dp 
principles like that of fairness, purpose specification, access and rectification rights (Art.8(2)). 
Further, true to the salient data protection laws, it requires that an independent authority 
oversees the enforcement of the right (Art.8(3)). The Charter also envisages that with 
“consent of the person concerned or some other legitimate basis laid down by law” (Art.8(2)) 
processing of personal data is permissible, thus, echoing the DPD. As both Convention 108 
and the DPD are mentioned in the official explanation of the provision, it is argued that they 
need to be taken into account in its interpretation.
144
 This is particularly significant 
development in relation to the definition of ‘personal data’ as it markedly differs from Art.8 
of the ECHR, as understood by the ECtHR, that makes ‘private life’ at the center of its 
analysis and thereby leaves some ‘personal data’ unprotected. 
It would, therefore, be sound to treat the inclusion of Art.8 of the Charter as a remedy to the 
partial protection of personal data under the ECHR. It is to be noted that the incorporation of a 
separate right under Art.8 of the ECHR was rejected based on the reasoning that the 
provision, as developed by case law, was ‘effective enough to offer satisfactory protection,’145 
which is doubtful as we have seen.  
The importance of the Charter for a stronger protection of personal data in Europe is also 
observed from a different angle, as follows. After its adoption, the Charter was given a legal 
effect with the same value as the Treaties
146
 during the Lisbon Treaty.
147
 Then followed the 
reproduction of Art.8(1) of the Charter in the TFEU itself (Art.16). This latter provision 
empowers the European Parliament and the Council to establish rules on ‘the protection of 
individuals with regard to the processing of personal data.’ This said, under Art. 100a148 of the 
former Treaty establishing the European Community (TEC), according to which the DPD was 
adopted, EU laws could only be passed for the establishment and functioning of the internal 
market, thus it “does not confer on the European legislator a competence in the sector of 
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human rights.”149 Hence, according to Romano, Art.16 of TFEU gives a new competence to 
the EU institutions to enact laws that might not align with the internal market,
150
 and the 
Charter is where it all begins. The draft General Regulation on Data Protection that the 
Commission introduced in 2012, thus, logically opens by referring to this competence.    
3.2 The Data Protection Directive 95/46/EC   
The Directive, as discussed in relation to different topics above, is clearly the other important 
legal standard for the protection of personal data in Europe. It is framed in such a way that it 
obliges Member States to enact laws that ensure the conditions under which ‘personal data’ 
can legitimately be ‘processed’ by a ‘data controller,’ are met and thereby the interests of data 
subjects are safeguarded. Thus, what is protected is a personal data, when processed by an 
agent qualifying as ‘data controller’ under the Directive. The core concepts have specially 
gained complexity with the growth of internet based services that has not been foreseen by the 
Directive, among them being SNSs.
151
 With a view to laying a foundation against which the 
operation of Facebook is analyzed in the subsequent chapter, these core elements are briefly 
discussed below.   
3.2.1. Personal Data under the Directive    
A personal data, according to the Directive, is “any information relating to an identified or 
identifiable natural person; ….an identifiable person is one who can be identified, directly or 
indirectly…” (Art.2(a)) (emphasis mine). The information being ‘any’ and only ‘relating’ to 
an individual, who has a potential to be ‘identified’ even ‘indirectly’ attest to the broadness of 
the term. As Bygrave puts it, “there is no prima facie requirement that the data relates to a 
particular … sphere of person’s activity.”152 Thus, it suffices that the data can potentially help 
identify a person. The centrality of ‘identifiability’ is provided for under recital 26 of the 
Directive, where it is provided that “… to determine whether a person is identifiable, account 
should be taken of all the means likely reasonably to be used either by the controller or by any 
other person to identify the said person.” At the crux of the recital is that the capability or 
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potential of identification of a person, and not an actual identification as such is what matters 
most.
153
  
Even if disagreements abound as to its precise scope,
154
 relevant case laws show that, among 
others, name, address, place of residence, salary amount of a public servant, data of birth, 
contact details, financial, medical, and social work details, relationship status, political 
allegiance, sexual, genetic, and racial details, school records, domestic situation are among 
those that are considered personal under the DPD.
155
 Whether Internet Protocol (IP) addresses 
are personal data is not well settled. While the Working Party considers it as safer to treat 
them as personal data
156
 as do many European PDAs, courts are divided on the issue.
157
 The 
problem emanates from the fact that dynamic IP addresses may not identify a user, but only a 
device and only at a certain timeframe. 
3.2.2. Processing of Personal Data  
Processing is defined under the Directive as an operation on personal data and includes 
activities such as ‘collection, recording, organization, storage, adaptation or alteration, 
retrieval, consultation, use, disclosure by transmission, dissemination or otherwise making 
available, alignment or combination, blocking, erasure or destruction’ (Art.2(b)). Such a 
broad understanding implies, among others, that the instrument used is immaterial as far as it 
is automated or, if manually operated, it is done in an accessible manner (Art.2(b-c)). Besides, 
there is a processing under the Directive even if the data has not been communicated to a third 
party as collection or storing alone is ‘processing’. It can also be argued that the intention of 
the one processing the data is not at issue, as the definition is rather an objective one. 
However, the purpose and effect of processing are important as they implicate the exception 
provided for under Art.3(2). Thus a processing “by a natural person in the course of a purely 
personal or household activity” is excluded from the application of the Directive. It is 
observed that the ECJ has developed a restrictive interpretation of the exception.
158
 For 
instance, in the leading but controversial case, the Lindqvist,
159
 the ECJ considers Lindqvist’s 
posting on a homepage she created regarding a colleague as a ‘publication on the Internet so 
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that those data are made accessible to an indefinite number of people’ and thus clearly not 
falling under the exception.
160
 The fact that a person does not economically benefit from an 
activity in relation to personal data does not make the activity personal or household. It seems 
that the number of people who have access to it is what is rather important. In line with this, 
in Italy, an entry of personal data into sites that are visible only to a limited number of people, 
is considered as falling under the exception.
161
 
It can be observed that as social networks normally work through collection (through 
registration or otherwise) and storing personal data, among other things, their activities would 
simply qualify as processing under the DPD.  
At last, the issue of anonymisation deserves some remarks as it touches both notions of 
personal data and processing and given its relevance to SNSs including Facebook.
162
 It is 
defined as a ‘process by which information is manipulated (concealed or hidden) to make it 
difficult to identify data subjects.
163
 According to recital 26 of the Directive, data rendered 
anonymous in such a way that the data subject is no longer identifiable is no longer personal. 
This, indeed, bodes well with the fact that identification is at the center of establishing what is 
‘personal data’. Meaning, if data is no more serving the purpose of identification, it is logical 
not to treat it as personal and worthy of protection.   
This said, what becomes an issue rather is whether the activity of anonymisation itself is 
‘processing’ and therefore needs prior consent or other legitimate grounds for processing. 
Against such a temptation, it is asserted that as the very process of anonymisation aims at 
rendering the data unidentifiable and therefore benefits data subjects, it should be encouraged 
instead of subjecting it to the dp laws (by treating it as processing).
164
 This is not convincing 
to me. For once, anonymisation does not necessarily benefit the data subject, for instance, in 
relation to exercising one’s right to access (DPD, Art.12). In addition, as the WP29 has 
brilliantly opined recently, anonymisation  can be fittingly considered as ‘further processing’ 
and a justification for it can be found either in the consent of data subjects or other grounds, 
mainly Articles 7(d) and (f).
165
 By so doing, we are only adding more safeguards of the dp 
laws. The application of the DPD can then be lifted regarding the data which is and until it 
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remains reasonably unidentifiable. This, of course, assumes that the data was acquired in 
accordance with the relevant dp laws.  
3.2.3. A Data Controller  
Even if the processing of a personal data triggers the application of the DPD, the ‘data 
controller’ occupies a central role in the overall application of the Directive and, thus, 
frequently comes into picture. Among others, the main dp principles target what data 
controllers should do
166
 and, as a result, the material scope of the Directive under Art.4 is 
defined mainly around the data controller. Indeed, it is the ‘controller’ who, in principle, is 
liable for damages resulting from unlawful processing.
167
 Thus, who is a controller? 
A data controller is a “natural or legal person, public authority, agency or any other body 
which alone or jointly with others determines the purposes and means of the processing of 
personal data” (emphasis added).168 The personal aspect of the definition being very broad, it 
follows a factual approach in identifying the controller.
169
 Meaning, it is determined 
irrespective of its actual legal capability to do so or an otherwise contractual designation as 
such.
170
 Given the fact that many people can get involved in the processing of personal data 
and, thus, complicating the identification of the controller, the WP29 takes a more pragmatic 
solution. Accordingly, it holds that the person who determines the purpose, as understood 
mainly in relation to the dp principle of purpose specification, is the de facto controller, as the 
determination of ‘means’ is usually delegated.171 
In light of this, SNSs simply qualify as data controllers under the Directive. This is so because 
as platforms for online communication, they enable individuals to publish and exchange 
information with other users and thereby decide the means to processes users’ data and 
determine what to do with it.
172
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3.2.4. Material Scope of the Directive (Art.4(a,c)) 
The relevant question here is as to in what sort of processing of personal data is the Directive 
applicable. Definitely, not whenever personal data is processed. Art.4 provides the solution 
based on, mainly the establishment of the data controller, thus following ‘territoriality 
principle.’173 Accordingly, the processing of personal data ‘carried out in the context of the 
activities of an establishment of the controller on the territory of the Member State’ is the first 
yardstick for the application of the Directive (Art.4(1(a)). In its extensive opinion,
174
 the 
WP29 stressed that by establishment, legal personality is not required, instead “the effective 
and real exercise of activities in the context of which personal data are processed” is 
decisive.
175
 This resembles recital 19 of the DPD. Further, while a mere existence of a server 
or a computer in a Member State would not qualify as an establishment, a one-man office or 
simple agent may be considered as such if it is ‘actively involved in the activities in the 
context of which the processing of personal data takes place’ and if such presence shows a 
sufficient stability.
176
 Appearance of permanency is also said to be embraced by the ECJ.
177
 
Further, the Working Party gave a hypothetical case of a controller headquartered outside the 
EU with “an office in Ireland dealing with issues connected with the processing of personal 
data, including in particular IT support” as satisfying the criteria.178 Thus, locating an 
establishment, in this way, in the Member States triggers the application of the Directive. It 
should be noted that the controller does not have to be established in the EU, nor does the 
actual processing need to happen there.
179
 Also, it does not require that the processing is 
carried out by the establishment.
180
  
The second ground for the application of the Directive, under Art.4(1(c) is to be found when 
the controller is not established or have an establishment but, ‘for purposes of processing 
personal data makes use of equipment … situated on the territory of the … Member State’ 
(emphasis added). The provision is of great importance in relation to the operations of most 
SNSs. While Moerel framed the use of the equipment in an EU member state as processing 
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taking place in the same,
181
 the Working Party considers it as signifying that ‘the processing 
of personal data has a clear connection with such territory.’182 The latter interpretation seems 
to go more in line with the wide application of the Directive that is meant to ensure that 
individuals are not left out.
183
  
Understood this way, it stands to fill a possible legal lacuna under Art.4(1(a) by covering 
situations where data is collected without a controller having an establishment in EU members 
or even if there is an establishment under (a), data is not processed in the ‘context of the 
activities’ of the establishment. In tune with this purpose, ‘making use’ of equipment is 
understood to involve some kind of activity that is meant to process personal data, which 
implies that ownership or full control of the equipment is not necessary.
184
 The meaning of an 
‘equipment’ under Art.4(1(c)) remains controversial185 and this is understandable given its 
ramification on the scope of application of EU dp laws on modern technologies that are 
known for deploying sophisticated ways of running their businesses. The Working Party 
almost equates ‘equipment’ with a ‘means’,186 a word that has proven to have a very wide 
coverage as observed in national states practices.
187
 The purpose of the provision and the fact 
that many national laws and majority versions of the Directive use ‘means’ or expressions of 
similar effect, are forwarded as justifications for the broad interpretation.
188
 As a result, 
deploying cookies, for instance, is considered as ‘making use of an equipment’ by the 
Working party,
189
 even if writers would find this as unintended overstretching of the legal 
system.
190
 In addition “other doubts have been raised about the nature of cookies as personal 
data, since cookies definitively identify a terminal (or a session opened into a terminal), but 
not an individual as such.”191 Besides as cookies normally give a notification and they need to 
be installed by a computer user, rejecting this installation seem to deprive the user of the dp 
protection as Art.4(1(c) applies only if the controller uses an equipment, which is the users’ 
computer.  
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Based on such wide scope of application of the Directive, SNSs have been treated as, one way 
or the other, falling under the ambit of the Directive in relation to personal data from 
European users. The Working Party has repeatedly reaffirmed that
192
 and indeed the broad 
construction of Art.4 means it is likely to be applicable on SNSs even if they are 
headquartered outside the EU. The broad interpretation in such a way that IP addresses are 
treated as personal data and that cookies constitute an equipment makes it easier for the 
Directive to have an application on many of the US based internet giants, like Facebook.  
 
3.3 The Proposed Data Protection Regulation: Changes Regarding Consent    
3.3.1. Background to the Regulation  
In January 2012, the Commission proposed a comprehensive data protection regime with a 
view to strengthening data protection rights. Most importantly, it has proposed a General Data 
Protection Regulation, to replace Directive 95/46/EC.
193
 Two main reasons were forwarded 
by the Commission in support of the proposal, namely, difference in the implementation of dp 
laws among Member States and ‘legal uncertainty concerning how to deal with the significant 
risks associated notably with online activity’.194 As it stands now, the Parliament has, on 
March 12, 2014, significantly endorsed the Commission’s Proposal with some amendments 
and an adoption by the Council is what is mainly left for it to become a law.
195
   
 
As the Memo that the Commission released following the endorsement by the Parliament 
shows, there has been three main innovations the Regulation would bring, looked from the 
side of businesses. The first being the introduction of a single law to all EU member states as 
the Regulation will be directly applied, the second is establishing a single supervisory body.
196
 
The third purpose aims to expand the application of the European dp law on non-European 
entities by expanding its territorial scope and equipping European regulators with strong 
enforcement mechanisms.
197
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3.3.2. Consent under the Proposed Regulation  
A Eurobarometer in 2011 reveals that nine out of ten Europeans are concerned about mobile 
apps collecting their data without their consent, and seven out of ten are worried that their 
information might be disclosed by the companies holding them.
198
 In response to such 
concerns, the Proposed Regulation has introduced some changes on the way consent currently 
works under the Directive.  
 The first change relates to the very definition of ‘consent’. According to Art.4(8) of the 
Proposed Regulation, consent means “any freely given specific, informed and explicit 
indication…” (emphasis added) The main change from Art.2(h) of the Directive is that 
consent now, by definition, should be explicit. If we can take a lesson from the use of the term 
under Art.8 of the Directive in relation to sensitive data, it increases the threshold. By so 
doing, the Proposed Regulation avoids the distinction between ‘unambiguous’ and ‘explicit’ 
consent that, under the Directive, pertain to ordinary personal data and that of sensitive data, 
respectively.
199
 Under the Regulation, as it stands now, consent can only be given by an 
affirmative action, including by ticking boxes.
200
 
The other substantial change introduced is to be found under Art.7 of the Proposed 
Regulation. The provision made it clear that the burden of proving that consent is given rests 
with data controllers. In addition, it has clearly recognized the right of data subjects to 
withdraw one’s consent at any time.201 It also codified the highly accepted opinion that when 
there is a significant imbalance between the position of the data subject and the controller, 
consent won’t be the appropriate mechanism to process personal data. Even if the data 
processing in the context of employment and public law areas are mentioned as instances, this 
provision may potentially have a restricting effect on the use of consent as a ground for 
personal data processing.   
Lastly, under Art.18(2), data subjects have a right to demand the transmit of their personal 
data to another controller, if, among others, processing by the first controller was based on 
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their consent. This provision might have a particular relevance to SNSs so that data subjects 
can change services based upon their consideration without inconvenience.  
In a form of conclusion, what can be said in general is that consent is and indeed has been 
playing an important role in the conception of the data protection law in Europe, as the 
Working Party has also confirmed.
202
 The Proposed Regulation is also following a suit. What 
stands out in the proposal is its details and a general higher threshold of consent by including 
‘explicit’ as an part of the definition. It appears that with the kind of strict implementation 
envisaged in the Proposed Regulation, coupled with a higher and uniform consent 
requirement, the role of consent can be diminished in effect.      
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4 Do Facebook’s Data Processing Practices comply with the Requirements of 
Consent Under the Directive? an Assessment 
Facebook, a giant internet based service, is known for the processing of massive personal data 
from its users. As the main justification for the validity of such processing is the consent of 
the users, it is imperative to assess if the required kind of consent is indeed being secured, the 
standard being the Directive. In this chapter, therefore, the service provider is briefly 
introduced and the applicability of the Directive to the service provider’s European operations 
established. Following that, the chapter examines the functioning and some major privacy 
challenges in the operations of Fabcebook. Lastly, it renders the assessment in light of the 
particular elements of consent as discussed in the second chapter.   
4.1 Facebook Introduced   
Founded in 2004 with a mission to ‘give people the power to share and make the world more 
open and connected’, Facebook has, as of September 30, 2014, 1.35 Billion monthly active 
users, with more that 82% of users being outside the US and Canada.203 It remains the most 
popular social networking service worldwide. In Europe, it leads the market in 17 of 25 
countries,204 and according to a study conducted in 2012, Facebook is said to add 15.3 billion 
Euros to the European market.205 Compared to Twitter, another popular SNSs, it has five 
times the number of monthly active users and enjoyed over ten times in revenue in the second 
quarter of 2014, amassing 2.91 billion dollars in revenue.206 Tsaoussi identified three features 
that give Facebook its popularity, namely: 
 a) Users can exchange messages, including automatic notifications when they  
update  their profile, 
(b) They can join common interest user groups (organized by workplace, school, or 
college, or other characteristics, and  
                                                          
203
 Facebook, Newesroom, 2014 
204
 Edwards (2013) p.2 
205
 Facebook Newsroom (2012) 
206
 Twitter v Facebook (2014) 
37 
 
(c) Build “Applications” which allow users to personalize their profiles and perform 
other tasks.207 
Beyond these organizational configurations, privacy relevant choices at its initial stages are 
also regarded to have given Facebook a plus over competitors. Ellison and boyd, for instance, 
suggested that Facebook gave the possibility for users to decide who, in their network, can 
view different aspects of their profiles unlike, say, LinkedIn that controls what a viewer can 
see depending on the type of their account or MySpace that only provided a ‘public’ or 
‘friends only’ options.208 Particularly, unlike other SNSs of the time, Facebook “did not 
initially allow users to make any of their content broadly accessible.”209 The possibility of 
more privacy control was, thus, an advantage for Facebook from early on. This model remains 
at the center of Facebook even today, but works in a complicated way.  
When users open a Facebook account, they are required to provide demographic data such as 
their name, age, study, gender, relationship status and so forth. It also encourages them to 
provide their address, telephone number, occupation, photographs, work places, places lived 
in, life events, interest and other details.210 Having provided the data, users are asked to agree 
on Facebook’s terms of use, which details relationship between Facebook and users, including 
the way Facebook uses users data. Thus, the accumulation of extensive personal data begins 
from the very outset. With time, Facebook introduced many features and with that came more 
data. Among others, status updating and photo/video sharing that is also immediately sent out 
to ‘friends’ (the News Feed feature); a chronicled display of a user’s history of Facebook 
activity in their Facebook ‘Walls’ (the Timeline), private messaging, ‘likes’ and ‘interests’ 
have all been a source of immense data for the platform. As can be seen from the list of items 
under ‘Accessing your Facebook Data’211 at least 69 sets of data are stored with Facebook.  
Facebook, as many other SNSs, has been instrumental in serving the public in many ways, be 
it in education, social relationship, the promotion and creation of business and in helping 
organize political movements. However, as Facebook’s main revenue is dependent on users’ 
personal data, privacy concerns and, indeed, incidents are rife. Given its reach and the ever 
growing sophistication, it is rational to think that its privacy related practices would have a 
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considerable implication, not only on the over a billion users, but also on the regulatory 
system of SNSs in general.    
4.2 The Application of the Directive on Facebook 
The DPD mainly works by imposing certain obligations on data controllers and providing 
corresponding rights to data subjects to manage their personal data, where consent features 
predominantly. As per Art.2(d) of the DPD, a data controller is one who decides the purpose 
and means of the processing. SNSs are by definition controllers, simply because they are the 
ones who, mainly through the setup and organization of their services, decide the purpose of 
the processing, which usually is “to  allow users  to  engage  in  social  networking  so  that  
advertisers  can  use information  posted  on  user profiles  to  better  target  their  ads.”212 As 
discussed above, Facebook qualifies as a controller. 
The other important condition for the application of the Directive over Facebook  would be if 
the latter processes personal data as discussed in chapter three. As highlighted above, both 
‘processing’ and ‘personal data’ are defined broadly. Besides, it is clear that much of what 
Facebook users provide while opening an account or through their posts and tagging is plain 
personal data and even some would qualify as sensitive. As Facebook operates with users 
data, including by registration, storage and transferring to third parties, the processing of 
personal data is easily satisfied.  
Still, the fact that Facebook makes personal data anonymous when providing it to advertisers 
cannot be a defense,
213
 at least for three reasons. First, for anonymisation to happen, Facebook 
needs to have personal data acquired as per the dp laws. Second, the processes of 
anonymisation  itself can be very well considered as a ‘further processing’ and thus requiring 
a specific consent or other ground, as we have seen is necessary. Third, given all the means 
available to Facebook, it is easy to link the data back to an identifiable person.  
The last and important point to consider so as to establish the applicability of the Directive on 
Facebook pertains to its scope of application under Art.4. Accordingly, the Directive governs 
processing of personal data ‘carried out in the context of activities of the establishment of the 
controller’ on the Member States and to processing of personal data for which purpose the 
controller ‘makes use of an equipment, automated or otherwise, situated on the territory.’ 
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Arguably, the operations of Facebook, at least, in relation to users from Europe, fall under the 
Directive on both counts. 
In relation to the first criteria under Art.4 (a), the relevant question is if Facebooks offices in 
Europe qualifies as an ‘establishment’ and if processing of personal data from Europe is done, 
wherever that might be, in the context of the activities of the offices. In this regard, Facebook 
has not been open in relation to its operation in Europe. For instance, it is reported that 
“information about the exact nature of the activities of the Facebook offices located in Europe 
and, most important, whether they are involved in data processing is very difficult to 
obtain.”214 Facebook does not also reply individual questions about its operations. 
However, on its own admission, it appears that it has establishments in Europe. Facebook 
opened an office in London in 2007. A year later, it announced that it has opened an 
international headquarter in Dublin, Ireland. The Office is described by Facebook as the 
center of international operations and provides ‘a range of online technical, sales, and 
operations support to Facebook’s users and customers across Europe, the Middle East and 
Africa.”215 Further, the Statement is treated as an agreement between Facebook Ireland 
Limited and Facebook users residing outside the US and Canada,
216
 signaling that this Dublin 
office works as an independent entity. Given the wide interpretation of an ‘establishment’, 
this becomes a clear case that Facebook Ireland falls within its ambit. Hence, processing of 
personal data from Europe, that would be carried out in relation to the activities of the Dublin 
office, among others, would be subject to the Directive.  
This said, in its recent amendment of the Data Use Policy, Facebook has made it clear that 
Facebook Ireland Limited has been established and registered in Ireland as a private limited 
company and is the data controller responsible for the personal data of people outside the US 
and Canada.217 Thus, Art.4(1(c) of the Directive would not be appropriate to our case as it 
deals with a scenario where the controller is not established in the EU.  
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4.3 Facebook Basics and Some Privacy Concerns   
Lilian Edwards would advise us that one way of understanding data protection issues in SNSs 
is to see their revenue source and business models.218 Writers Enders et al classified the 
revenue models of SNSs into three major categories, i.e., advertising, subscription and 
transaction.219 Advertising, in turn, can take two forms, namely affiliate models and banner 
advertising.220 In the first model, an SNS steers traffic to an affiliate website and charges for 
the referral, and in the latter, advertisement is displayed on the SNSs.221 Facebook mainly 
relies on advertisement as its main source of revenue. For instance in its statement on June 18, 
2013, Facebook declared that it has over 1 million active advertisers.222 Marketers and 
advertisers select target audience and Facebook, using its sophisticated mining technology 
and immense personal data of users, provide the targeted group. It is right here that the extent 
and quality/accuracy of personal data becomes very crucial for Facebook to strive, as the 
payment from the advertisers depends on, usually, the number of clicks, which in turn 
depends on the accuracy of selection. As the then EU Commissioner Meglena Kuneva Is 
quoted as saying in 2009, personal data is, as with Facebook, the “new oil of the internet and 
the new currency of the digital world.”223 As such, the privacy concerns of Facebook 
operations have, mainly, bean related to how it acquires the extensive personal data it 
processes and how it treats it afterwards.  
Many incidents have brought Facebook privacy issues into spotlight and takes different 
dimensions. The consequences of privacy lapses as well vary from simple discomfort and 
surprises to embarrassment and frustration; from reputational damage to identity theft; from 
loss of job and school disciplinary measures to suicides. Obviously, some features of the 
service infringe data protection principles more than others. Following are some of Facebook 
services that have been steering privacy related controversies. 
4.3.1 Third Party Applications  
Facebook allows third parties to develop applications, such as games, using its platform, as 
regulated under the ‘Facebook Platform Policies’. Accordingly, Facebook allows application 
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developers to access personal data of its users, upon certain conditions. Among these 
conditions are that applications have their own privacy policy and that they obtain users’ 
consent before using their data.224 It also includes that they can use ‘friend data (including 
friends list) in the person’s experience’ in their application.225 Strictly personal data that 
Facebook has, nonetheless, labeled as ‘public’ are also available to apps, arguably in 
contradiction to the minimality principles of data protection. When users install some of these 
applications, they need to give their consent for the app to access their data. However, in some 
of them, the terms are not easily accessible or are not to be found as the Irish Audit Report on 
Facebook revealed in 2011.226 In those cases, the legitimacy of processing is questionable on 
many grounds. Besides, some ‘terms of use’ do not inform users of the purpose of the vast 
access that the applications require from users, who have to either chose to accept it in its 
totality or not access the service. I have also observed that a great deal of apps are by default 
public, meaning anyone online can see that a user has installed the app. It is also bewildering 
wherefrom Facebook acquires a mandate to allow the applications to use friends’ data as the 
screenshot below shows. 
 
It is obvious that such third party applications can be held accountable as controllers. That 
being true, Facebook is facilitating the infringements. It is less likely that Facebook plays by 
the rules against the third party applications as it charges them 30% of their revenues for 
using the platform.227 Such applications have been a subject of complaints in Ireland, the US 
and Canada, among others.228 The finding of the Norwegian Consumer Council that many 
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Facebook users are not aware as to the existence of these applications also strengthens a doubt 
if an informed consent is given for their access to personal data. 
4.3.2 Timeline   
In December 2011, Facebook introduced the timeline, which if effect is an orderly display of 
users Facebook history. Some of the difficulties that came with the introduction of timeline 
are spelt out as follows229: i) hiding mutual friends by users became impossible; ii) it is no 
more possible to limit the public view of cover photos and iii) specific time when friends were 
added and pages liked can be seen. These all have serious implications, for instance, on 
security of users. As a new feature, depriving users of controlling their accessibility is a 
significant data protection issue.  
4.3.3 The ‘Like’ Button  
Another feature introduced in 2010, the ‘Like’ button, according to Facebook, is a social plug 
in that web sites can use, where a click means sharing them on Facebook.230 The system is 
tested for its efficacy in increasing traffic to sites and has been very popular among 
businesses.231 If the one clicking is a Facebook user, the activity is reported in his/her News 
Feed to his/her friends. Moreover, when a logged in Facebook user visits a site with the ‘Like’ 
button, she/he is presented with  “personalised content based on what their friends have liked, 
recommended, or commented upon on the site.”232 It is argued that such data gives Facebook 
an excellent clue on the preferences and interests of its users. It is difficult if such data that 
Facebook gets can be justified by consenting to the Statements given its far reaching effect.   
4.3.4 The Changing Default Privacy Setting    
One of the challenges of relying on consent as a justifying ground for the processing of 
personal data is that the prerequisites that data subjects read, understand and make an 
informed decision has been, in many ways, challenged. Thus, low rate of privacy policy 
reading and understanding is well documented.233 In addition, even if users have a chance to 
control the accessibility of their data using the privacy setting that SNSs usually provide, for 
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different reasons, it might not be as used expected. For instance, in the UK, a research showed 
that more than half of SNSs users left their setting on default,234 thus at the mercy of the 
respective SNSs. The reasons include difficulty in operating the system and frequent changes 
in the part of the SNSs.235 As a result, user-friendly default setting serves as a safeguard 
instead of totally relying on consent, as the Working Party stressed.236 This was also 
emphasized by the Council of Europe, where lack of privacy-friendly default settings was 
found to be one of the threats of the right to private life attributable to SNSs.237 
Against this requirement, Facebook fares bad as, with successive changes in its setting, more 
personal data is rendered public.238 As Facebook default setting stands at early January of 
2015, the following can be observed. While future posts (status/photo/video/shared content) 
are visible to ‘friends’ and timeline posts are possible by ‘friends’; tags review before it is 
posted on Facebook is set to ‘off’ and ‘friends of friends’ can see posts users are tagged in 
their timeline, resulting in less protection. However, there has been an encouraging 
development as well. For instance, the default setting of Facebook as outlined by the Irish 
report on Facebook in 2011, shows that status updates and posts were set to ‘public’.239  
Surprisingly, ‘life events’ posts, including users’ health and wellness are set as ‘public’, as are 
all ‘likes’, thus visible to, i.e., ‘anyone on or off Facebook’. What is more, apps, plug ins, and 
instant personalization are, by default ‘enabled’. However, unlike the situation prior to 2011, 
there are no more selected partner sites, upon users first visit, provide a personalized 
experience until they are turned off. In addition, the ‘take a privacy tour,’ prompt for new 
users is also encouraging.  
As can be seen from the descriptions of the current default setting, there are some positive 
developments. However, the use of ‘friends of friends’ and the fact that health and family 
related posts are set to ‘public’ does not go in line with the minimal visibility that user-
friendly settings demand.    
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4.4 Facebook’s Statement of Rights and Responsibilities and Data Use Policy  
As the opening of the Statement reads, ‘by using or accessing Facebook’ users agree to the 
Statement, as updated from time to time in accordance with Section 14.’ Supplementing this, 
Art.14(3) reads, ‘your continued use of Facebook following changes to our terms constitutes 
your acceptance of our amended terms’ and thereby gives Facebook an important leverage. 
The Changes may be posted on ‘Facebook Site Governance Page’, which only has some three 
million followers. Many times, what Facebook does is give a notice to users like in the screen 
shot herein below. 
 
The Statement govern the relation between Facebook and users, applications developers, page 
administrators, advertisers, and sites using Facebook plug ins, with each referred to further 
information linked. Much of the Statement being on the responsibility of the other parties, 
users’ issues of privacy are governed at first, though not fully. Thus, section 1 refers users to 
read the ‘data use policy’ concerning how Facebook collets and uses personal data with 
section 2(4) telling or warning users as to the effect of publishing content as ‘public’. 
Under the data use policy, the sources of information that Facebook collets include 
information required for registration; information shared by users as public and via friends 
adds, page or website likes, and some data that are treated as made public by definition, i.e. 
name, profile pictures, cover photos, gender, networks, username and User ID. Some reasons 
are given as to why these are treated as such, but only towards the end. The other sources of 
data being friends of users, the last source, presented in a condensed and ill structured 
paragraph, includes information from: running Facebook (messages, looking at others’ 
timeline), ‘time and location data from posts; visits to games and sites with Facebook 
platform and plug ins, and from advertising sites and affiliates. It is also vaguely provided that 
it may also be collected from ‘click on, view or otherwise interact with things (emphasis 
added))’ 
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Concerning the purposes for which Facebook uses users’ data, it provides both a general and 
some instances of the purposes of using users’ data. Thus, it can be used “in connection with 
the services and features we provide to you and other users like your friends, our partners, the 
advertisers that purchase ads on the site, and the developers that build the games, applications, 
and websites you use.” Among the particular purposes mentioned, they include: helping 
people see and find things that you do and share, keeping Facebook safe and secure; to protect 
Facebook’s and other rights, measuring or understanding the effectiveness of ads you and 
delivering them; for internal operations, including troubleshooting, data analysis, testing, 
research and service improvement. Sharing with others is also indirectly provided with some 
conditions like by ‘by telling you about it in this policy’. Besides, towards the end, it is 
provided that Facebook may ‘allow service providers to access information so they can help 
us provide services.’ It is very important to note that ‘information’ is defined very broadly and 
circularly under the Statement  as facts or other information about you, including actions 
taken by users and non-users who interact with Facebook (Art.18(3)).  
Duration wise, Facebook stores data ‘for as long as it is necessary to provide products and 
services to you and others’. The presentation of both the Statement and the data use policy is 
okay, excepting for certain parts. However, finding the terms and the data use policy is a bit 
tricky. For instance, it cannot be simply glanced from the timeline page.  
From the above presentation, many important data protection relevant observations can be 
made. Below, I limit the discussion into consent related requirements under the Directive.   
4.5. Do Facebook Operations Satisfy the Consent Threshold under the 
Directive ?  
As discussed under the second chapter, for consent to justify the processing of personal data, 
it needs to be informed, given freely and informed. In addition, the way it is given should be 
unambiguous or, for sensitive data, explicit. At this juncture, It should be noted that these 
traits of consent, as envisaged in the Directive, are not easily susceptible for a meaningful 
measurement. Keeping this inherent challenge in mind, the opinions of the WP29, among 
others, provide important guides on general indicators of what ‘informed’ ‘specific’ or ‘freely 
given’ means in different circumstances. We should, therefore, use them, as appropriate. 
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To begin with the requirement that consent be ‘freely given’, the kind of consent that 
Facebook users give does not seem to satisfy the threshold. For consent to be considered as 
freely given, for instance, data subjects should have a real choice, where denying consent 
should not result in inability to access. This is far from the way Facebook, and indeed many 
SNSs, work. Users can only join Facebook by accepting its terms that include the data use 
policy. Frequent updates that Facebook introduces from time to time also do not give users a 
chance to deny consent without quitting the service completely. Quitting the service is not a 
choice per se as it means losing a social network that users have built, may be for free, for 
years.     
Concerning the specificity of the consent that Facebook users give as required by the 
Directive, I have observed the following. As discussed above, the application of specific 
consent implies that users are able to indicate their authorization to different purposes that 
their data can be used for. This possibility is nonexistent in the way Facebook terms are 
accepted. Users are provided with different purposes for which their data can be used, but do 
not have a means to indicate which purpose they are willing their data to be used for. In 
addition, expressions like that users’ data can be used “in connection with the services and 
features we provide to you’ is very generic and, thus, against the requirement. Maybe, the 
possibility of limiting audience, specially the recently added ‘only me’ option can be a way to 
show some level of preference, but not a substantial one. I would strongly expect Facebook to 
provide a separate possibility of consenting mainly in relation to the collection and sharing of 
personal data with third parties as this is where complaints abound. 
The last element of consent being that it be informed, it has, mainly, to do with sufficiency 
and presentation of information in such a way that data subjects can understand the 
implication of giving a consent. The way the the statement and the data use policy are 
presented, at least in terms of layout and font usage, my general observation is positive. 
However, there are serious issues that need a due consideration. First, the Facebook terms 
(both the statement and the data use policy) are not readily accessible from many pages of a 
Facebook account. Second, the fact that the Statement contains provisions addressed to 
individual users and others, mainly corporate partners, could be a source of confusion, and it 
would have been better for users to have it separately. Thirdly, the provision in the data use 
policy pertaining to third party apps as sources of information is not clearly stipulated and is 
written in a condensed way. Generic purposes like for ‘research’ ‘improvement’ are also 
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against the requirement. Lastly, it should be noted that the frequent changes that Facebook 
does on its policies and settings might not reach users. It seems that a better way of 
communicating users on developments that affect their interest, for instance, through email as 
Facebook has it already, could help in this regard.  
Moving to the ways of indicating consent, the Directive stipulates that there should be a clear 
indication of one’s consent. Applying this to Facebook operations, even if it can be argued 
that potential users’ indication of consent by clicking the ‘Sign up’ sign amounts to 
unambiguous action, Art. 14(3) of the statement is particularly problematic, as ‘continued use’ 
including for possible changes in the terms, is considered as signifying consent. As this is a 
simple inaction, we can read ambiguity in it and, therefore, short of the Directive requirement. 
As the threshold in this regard is set to increase in the proposed Regulation, it is hoped that 
Facebook would change such terms.  
Similar problem is noticed in relation to the processing of sensitive data that the Directive 
requires to be given explicitly. To begin with, Facebook does not separate its set of data as 
sensitive or otherwise and treats them equally. Moreover, the fact that posts regarding ‘life 
events’ that include health, which is a sensitive data under Art.8(1) of the Directive, is shared 
to ‘public’ by default is a clear contravention of the Directive.      
From the forgoing discussion, it can be deducted that Facebook has a long way to go to 
comply with the European rules. Most importantly, it needs to improve its handling of users’ 
data in relation with its partners. Much is also needed in informing users, providing them with 
options of giving consent in relation to specific purposes and making the terms easily 
accessible to users. The higher threshold and enhanced enforcement mechanisms envisaged 
by the proposed Regulation is hoped to tame some of Facebook’s privacy related operations. 
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5 Conclusion and Recommendations 
Data protection law is an emerging area of law that aims at safeguarding personal data of 
individuals against excessive and unwarranted access and use. Originally introduced as a 
means to curb government surveillance, it found a higher relevance with the increase in 
computational prowess of modern technological tools, the computer and the internet being the 
principal ones. More recently, the emergence of social networking service has made the 
protection of data protection very important and yet complicated 
In Europe, successive laws have been adopted in this regard. The relevant laws reveal that 
personal data is protected as a matter of human right as much as for its economic ends. In 
relation to the second purpose, the increasing importance of personal data in the growing 
internet based services coincides with the creation of a single market in Europe. The 1995 
Directive, therefore, has a purpose of ensuring that personal data of European is protected as 
much as it concerns itself with ensuring unfettered flow of data within the Union.  
A broad material scope of the Directive means that it applies on controllers established in 
Europe, those from outside Europe, but have an establishment in Europe in relation to which 
processing occurs; and to those with no establishment in the EU, but use some equipments in 
Europe to acquire data. The Directive mainly works by imposing certain requirements, in a 
form of dp principles, on controllers and puts data subjects in the other end of the equation 
with certain rights in relation to the processing of the data that identifies them, even indirectly. 
Thus, for a controller to justify a processing of personal data, there needs to be some solid 
ground(s) that the law stipulates, consent from data subjects being one of the justifications and 
is frequently in use. Other data principles also are there to mitigate excessive processing. 
As important as it is for individuals to be able to have a decisive say on data identifying them 
through consent, it has also proved to suffer some limitations. Among other, it is difficult to 
tell there really is consent with all its traits and this can be manipulated by controllers. This is 
specially so with the popular social networking sites that rack immense data from their users. 
With a view to mitigate such problems, the Directive demands that consent be specific to a 
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certain purpose, informed and given freely. Besides, it demands that indication of consent be 
given clearly, leaving no doubt, as a validity requirement. 
Facebook, a leading social networking service, strives mainly on personal data of users. Users 
give their consent during registration and the terms they consent to dictate for future changes 
too. Some of Facebook’s features manifestly fall short of the Directive requirements. The fact 
that it does not enable users to separately consent for different purposes; its treatment of 
‘continued use’ as giving consent; its similar treatment of data regardless of sensitiveness; 
easily inaccessible terms and changing default setting that leave important personal data as 
‘public’; and its complicated relationship with third party partners are some of the issues that 
trigger uneasiness when assessed against the consent related requirements of the Directive. 
Hence, they need a due consideration from both Facebook and regulators besides an increased 
assertiveness and awareness of users. 
With a new legal regime with a broader scope; detailed rules; higher threshold of consent, and 
harnessed enforcement mechanisms looming, it is expected that consent of users will be used 
in a way that protects them better.   
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